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Abstract 
A Blue airborne force attacks a region defended by a single Red surface-to-air 
missile system (SAM). Red is uncertain about the Blues he faces, but is able to 
learn about them during the engagement. Reds objective is to develop a policy 
for shooting at the Blues to maximise the value of Blues shot down before he 
himself is destroyed. We show that index policies are optimal for Red in a range 
of scenarios and yield effective heuristics more generally. The quality of such 
index heuristics is confirmed in a computational study. 
1. Introduction and Basic Scenario 
The following scenario is a simplified version of one occurring when a Blue airborne 
force attacks a Red region defended by a Red missile system; see Barkdoll, et al (2001).  
A single Red surface-to-air missile (SAM)hereafter, simply Redcan attack and 
be attacked by a collection of N Blue airborne attackers, labelled 1 through N. Blues 
come in B types, but Red only has imperfect information concerning the nature of the 
Blues he is facing. Red is able to construct N (independent) prior distributions Π1, Π2,, 
ΠN which summarise his beliefs about the type identities of the Blues before any shooting 
starts. Hence Πbj  is the probability that Red assigns to the event Blue number j is of type 
b, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤ b ≤ B in advance of action. At each time t = 0,1,2, Red shoots at a 
single Blue and that Blue retaliates by firing back on Red. Red has a (constant) 
probability rb of destroying a type b Blue with a single shot, and has (constant) 
probability θb of being destroyed by a retaliatory strike. Red knows when a Blue has been 
destroyed because no retaliatory strike follows. All shooting outcomes are assumed to be 
independent of each other. If Red destroys a type b Blue with his tth shot then he receives 
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a reward Vbαt, where Vb is the utility associated with this occurrence and α ∈ [0,1] is a 
discount rate. Reds goal is to maximise the expected utility of Blues destroyed prior to 
his own destruction.  
A crucial feature of the model concerns Reds capacity to update his beliefs about the 
Blues he is facing in the light of the outcomes of past engagements, by using Bayes 
Theorem. In particular, if Blue target j has been involved in n engagements and he and 
Red have survived them all (note that this is the only event of interest for future  



























Hence, Reds beliefs about the Blues are evolving and this will plainly impact his 
shooting decisions.  
2. An Index Result for a Class of Generalised Bandit Problems 
The above problem will be analysed by means of a result due to Nash (1980), in a 
contribution that developed the classical index result of Gittins and Jones (1974). Nash 
envisages N bandits, the jth of which is in state Xj(t) at time t. A decision-maker chooses 
one of the bandits to process at each time t = 0,1,2. The effect of choosing bandit j at 
time t is as follows:  
(i) bandit j experiences a Markovian change of state Xj(t) → Xj(t + 1). Bandits not 
chosen remain fixed;  
(ii) a reward α t i i j ji j q X t R X ta fl q a fl q{ }≠∏  is generated.  
The novelty of this model concerned the multiplicatively separable reward structure 
in (ii) above. Here all bandits make a contribution to the rewards generated when j is 
chosen through the so-called influence functions qi. The qs and Rs are non-negative  
and bounded.  
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If some policy v is used for choosing bandits, with v(t) used for the choice made at t, 
then the total return under Nashs model can be written  
















PP0 a fl q a fm ra f a f a f . (2) 
The goal is to choose v to maximise the return in (2).  
Nash was able to show that, under certain conditions (which are satisfied in all of the 
problems discussed here), this problem has an index solution of the following character:  
at each time t, compute a calibrating index  
 G1{X1(t)}, G2{X2(t)}, , GN{XN(t)}  
for each bandit in its current state. An optimal policy will always choose that one of the 
bandits with the largest index. It does not matter how ties are broken.  
We can deploy Nashs model to solve our problem as follows:  the bandits correspond 
to the N Blues. The state Xj(t) of Blue j at time t has three components, labelled Πj(t), 
I tRj a f and I tBj a f. Here Πj(t) is the posterior distribution for Blue j describing Reds current 























if by time  has been destroyed by Red,
otherwise.
  
To deploy Nashs model for our problem we make the following choices for each j:  
 
q X t I t







a fl q a f




.0 0 0 whenever  or 
 (3) 
Otherwise Rj records a single return when Blue j is destroyed.  
The effect of the choices in (3), when placed within Nashs reward structure, is  
(a) to wipe out any further returns following Reds destruction by any Blue j; and 
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(b) to wipe out further returns from Blue j following its own destruction.  
This is precisely what we want. The total return in (2) is now exactly the expected utility 
of Blues destroyed until Reds own destruction.  
We return now to Nashs general model, but we shall exploit the fact that our q 
functions (from (3)) all have starting values 1, which remain there until a possible 
transition to 0. This simplifies the index structure considerably. Consider Blue j in some 
state x for which qj(x) = 1. We shall describe the index Gj(x) which is used in determining 
the optimal policy. Imagine Red shooting at Blue j (from initial state x at t = 0) until some 
positive-valued stopping time τ, defined with respect to Blues evolving state. Define the 
reward rate Gj(x,τ) earned up to τ by  
 G x
E R X t X x



















The index Gj(x) is the largest such reward rate, namely  







In the next section we show how to develop indices for the problem in Section 1. A 
general methodology for index computation for Nashs model may be found in 
Glazebrook and Greatrix (1995). Other discussions of Nashs model are found in Fay and 
Glazebrook (1987), Glazebrook and Owen (1991), Glazebrook and Greatrix (1993), and 
Glazebrook (1993).  
3. Indices for the Blues 
The problem in Section 1 may be formulated as a Bayes sequential decision problem 
(in which the expected reward is taken with respect to the prior distributions Πj, 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 
as well as over the realisations of the engagement) whose structure conforms to Nashs 
generalised bandit, as outlined in Section 2. Hence, all we have to do is specify what the 
indices Gj are which determine optimal policies for Red. In discussing this we can 
concentrate on individual Blues, and hence, drop the Blue identifier j.  
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Consider a Blue target whose associated prior is Π and which has had n engagements 
with Red, which have left both of them intact (IR = IB = 1). Refer to this state as (Π, n). 
For the purposes of Reds decision making it is only such Blues and such states which are 
of interest. In Reds next engagement with this Blue, three things can happen:  (1) Blue is 
destroyed and Red not; (2) Red is destroyed and Blue not; and (3) neither is destroyed. In 
the formulation as a Bayesian sequential decision problem we use the posterior in (1) to 
develop the probabilities of these three events as  
(1) p[Blue destroyed and Red not] = Π Πb b b n b nb r r D n1 1− −∑ a f a f a fθ , ,  
(3) p[neither destroyed] = Π Πb b n b nb r D n1 1
1 1
− −
+ +∑ a f a f a fθ , ,  
(2) p[Red is destroyed and Blue not] = 1  p[Blue destroyed and Red not]  
p[neither destroyed].  
In (1) and (3) we take D n rb b n b
n
b
Π Π,a f a f a f= − −∑ 1 1 θ .  
























a f a f
a f a f .  
Now, in following the prescription for computing the index at the end of Section 2 we 
only need (for theoretical reasons) to consider certain kinds of stopping time τ in our 
determination of the index G(Π, n) of the Blue under discussion. Specify positive integer 
r(≥ 1). We write τr for Reds stopping time in which, from time 0 (at which point the 
state of the Blue is assumed to be (Π, n)), Red has r further engagements with Blue 
unless one or other of them is destroyed first. The random variable τr is the number of 
shots from Red that results from this, and cannot exceed r or be less than one. The 
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and the expression in the denominator (recall that q is just IR) is  
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D n
a f a f a f a f a f a f{ }
a f
θ α θ α θ
,
. (7) 
From (5), (6) and (7) the index G(Π, n) may be developed as  
 G n






















, maxa f a f a f a f a f{ }a f a f k p=
− − − −





























1 1= − −+
=
−
∑α θa f a f   
and 
 A rb r b r b
r
2 1 1= − −α θa f a f .  
We can now implement an optimal policy. If Red is still alive, then he computes all the 
indices for the still live Blues and engages next whichever live Blue has the largest index. 
In order to understand index structure, introduce the so-called one-step index 
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1 1 1 1
. (9) 
It is straightforward to establish the following:  
(i) If H(Π, n) is decreasing in n, then the maximum in (8) is attained at r = 1 for all 
n and it then follows that G(Π, n) = H(Π, n) for all n. If this behaviour holds 
good for all Blues then the index policy is quasi-myopic (a one-step look ahead 
rule). Here indices are always decreasing, and so in an optimal policy, which 
always targets the Blue with the largest index, Red will switch his targeting of 
the Blues frequently.  
(ii) If H(Π, n) is increasing in n, then the maximum in (8) is attained for all n in the 
limit as r → ∞. Here G(Π, n) can be shown to be increasing in n. If this 
behaviour holds good for all Blues then Red will, in an optimal policy, persist in 
targeting individual Blues in turn until each is destroyed;  
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(iii) If there are just two Blue types (B = 2), then H(Π, n) will be either increasing or 
decreasing in n;  
(iv) H(Π, n) may be thought of (somewhat crudely) as a weighted average (with 
respect to the posterior distribution) of a vulnerability index  
 V r rb b b b1 1− + −α αθa f a fl q  
 for Blues of type b. This vulnerability index is high when Vb and rb are large and 
when θb is small. It is plainly such Blues that Red would like to shoot at. In fact, 
H(Π, n) takes expectations for the numerator and denominator of the 
vulnerability index separately. The index formula in (8) tells Red exactly how  
to choose.  
A variety of extensions to the above are available from standard index theory. Two are, 
perhaps, worthy of mention:  
(a) When new Blues arrive for engagement in a Poisson fashion, an index policy is 
still optimal. The index in (8) is not always quite the right one, but will do very 
well in practice. See Fay and Glazebrook (1992);  
(b) If there are several identical Red shooters operating in parallel, instead of just 
one, and the Red objective is to maximise the utility from destroying Blues until 
all Reds are destroyed, then the above index policy (operated in the obvious way) 
will do very well, but will not, in general, be strictly optimal. See Glazebrook 
and Garbe (1998). 
4. Some Major Extensions 
We elaborate the scenario in Section 1 by supposing that Red could be one of several 
(R) Red types and each Blue has at his disposal several weapons, some of which may be 
designed for use against particular Red types. In this situation, each Blue will seek to 
learn about what kind of Red type he faces as well as vice-versa. We shall assume that 
the individual Blues can only learn about Red independently of each otherthey cannot 
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pool information. We shall consider a range of approaches, in increasing levels of 
complexity. Note that there are minor variants of most of the following proposals and 
most of the objects described can be j (i.e., target) dependent.  
(a) Blues strategy known to Red  
 The simplest option is to suppose that each Blue type b has a strategy for 
choosing successive weapons in the face of inconclusive engagements and that 
these strategies are known to Red. Hence, for each blue type b, there is a 
sequence {Wb(n), n ≥ l} of weapons to be used. Note that we do not actually 
require that all Blues of type b have the same strategythat is just here for 
simplicity. An index policy is still optimal and the indices concerned involve 
minor adjustments to (8). We write  
 θ θb n mW
m
n





 where θW is the kill probability for weapon W. The index for this situation may 
be shown to be  
 G n

















































∑α θa f a f,   
 and 
 B r b n rb r b
r
2 1= − +α θa f a f, .  
(b) Blues beliefs known to Red  
 This is, in fact, a simple example of (a) in which Blues strategies Wb ≡ {Wb(n), 
n ≥ 1} are developed as Blue type b updates his prior beliefs Pb about the Red 
type he faces. This notation presupposes that all Blues of the same type will have 
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the same priors, but this is not an essential feature. If Red has access both to the 
Pbs and also to how Blue is using his posterior beliefs to choose successive 
weapons, then he has access to Blues strategy and a suitable form of the index in 
(11) can be used.  
(c) Blues beliefs not known to Red  
 The approaches in (b) will yield an optimal index policy whose return 
R(P1, P2, , PB) will depend upon the priors Pb describing Blues initial beliefs 
about Red. How do we proceed if we drop the assumption that Red knows the 
Pbs? The two classical decision-theoretic approaches are:  
(1) Suppose Red is minimax  
 Here Red acts conservatively and chooses the best (i.e., index) policy for the 
least favourable priors. For most reasonable models, this will amount to 
Red supposing that all Blues know what kind of Red type he is and 
calculating indices accordingly.  
(2) Suppose Red is Bayes  
 Here Red expresses his beliefs about the unknown Pbs via appropriate prior 
distributions φb(p). We are putting priors on priors, each of the latter being 
an R-dimensional probability vector p. Indices can now be developed as 
follows:   
For each b we have  
 p → weapon sequence Wb(p) → θ b n, ,pa f , n ≥ 1,   
 extending (10). The index (11) now is developed to become  
 
G n
r V r r b n s d




















a f a f a f{ } a f


































1p pa f a f a f= − ++
=
−
∑α θ , ,   
 and 
 C r b n rb r b r2 1p pa f a f a f= − +α θ , ,   
 and such indices determine the optimal policy for the Bayesian Red. In this 
formulation, Red can make inferences about Blues evolving beliefs about 
what kind of Red he is. For example, if R = 5 and a Blue type possesses 5 
weapons, each one potent against one of the 5 different Red types and 
ineffectual against the others, then after 4 inconclusive engagements, Red 
will understand that such a Blue type now almost certainly has a clear view 
of what kind of Red he is and that such a Blues next retaliation could well 
be fatal for him. The index in (12) will reflect these developing beliefs.  
An assumption that Blues can pool their information about Red will induce stochastic 
dependence among the Blues. Appropriately developed indices can do well but will not 
be strictly optimal. See, for example, Boys, Glazebrook and McCrone (1996).  
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Appendix A 
Issues for the Blue force 
The scenario is as in Section 1 of the main report where the primary focus is on Reds 
decision-making. However, the controller of the Blue force also faces some issues. A 
natural first question for Blue concerns what force he needs to deploy in order to destroy 
an optimally shooting Red with a given large probability, 0.95, say. This, in fact, turns 
out to be straightforward to assess. Suppose that Nb type b Blues are deployed, 1 ≤ b ≤ B. 
The probability of Reds ultimate survival (having destroyed all Blues) does not depend 
upon his strategy for engaging them. Hence, we may as well suppose that Red engages 
each Blue in a continuous fight until one or the other is destroyed. In such an engagement 
it is easy to show that  
 p b r rb b b bBlue of type  is destroyed = − =θ ψ1a f , say, 1 ≤ b ≤ B.  
Hence, the probability that Red survives the battle with Nb type b Blues, 1 ≤ b ≤ B, is 
given by  
 ψ ψ ψ1 21 2N N BNBK   
and the controller of Blue requires this to be less than or equal to 0.05, say. If there is 
only one Blue type, then the choice is of the smallest number N to deploy such that  
 ψN ≤ 0.05.   
If we now ask how the Blue force should accomplish the destruction of Red with 
given probability at least cost to itself, then the strategy for Red does come into play 
since, for example, Red may tend to engage expensive Blues first. Hence, we shall 
suppose that Red shoots optimally, and will consider a simple situation for Blue in which 
B = 2 and the loss of each type b costs him Cb, b = 1,2. We note from the main report that 
when B = 2, all indices are either increasing or decreasing in n. We shall suppose that the 
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former is the case for all Blues and so Reds optimal shooting policy engages each Blue 
non-preemptively until one or other is destroyed.  
Let the expected cost to the Blue force of the deployment of Nb type bs, b = 1,2 














where 1 ≥ ε ≥ 0 and 1  ε is the desired probability of killing Red.  
We describe a scenario in which C(N1, N2) may be computed easily. Reds priors for 
the Blue types he faces are obtained by moderating his ignorance about them (as initially 
expressed by p(Blue is of type b) = 0.5, b = 1,2) by means of information obtained from a 
sensor. This sensor can only judge Blue type with error. We have  
 p b b b bBlue judged to be of type Blue is of type 1 2 1 2= φ .  
Hence, Red allocates to each Blue one of two possible priors Πb, b = 1,2 according to the 
judgement of the sensor. We have  
 Π11 11 11 12= = +p Blue is of type 1 Blue judged to be of type 1 φ φ φa f  
and similarly for the other probabilities. Let X1 be a Bin(N1, φ11) random variable 
representing the number of the N1 type 1 Blue types judged by the sensor to be of type 1 
and hence, given prior Π1 by Red. Similarly, X2 ~ Bin(N2, φ22). Red faces X1 + N2  X2 
Blue types to which he allocates prior Π1 and initial index G1 and N1  X1 + X2 Blue types 
to which he allocates prior Π2 and initial index G2. Suppose G1 > G2 and so Red first 
engages all those Blues judged to be of type 1, followed by those judged to be of type 2. 
We assume that if Red faces two or more Blues with the same index then he chooses 
between them at random.  
Now the cost of engaging b1 (fixed) type 1 Blues and b2 (fixed) type 2 Blues in 
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Hence, the desired expected cost to Blue of the chosen deployment is given by  
 C N N E c X N X c N X XX N X1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 21 2 2, , ,a f a f a fm r= − + −−ψ ψ .  
This can now be used in (13).  
In more complicated situations, Blues expected cost may be computed via suitable 
development of the methodologies described by Bertsimas and Niño-Mora (1996) for 




Shoot-Look-Shoot for Red  
We elaborate the scenario described in Section 1 of the main report in two ways:   
(i) after every shot by Red, the targetted Blue is inspected and categorised (with 






Blue judged to be of type Blue is alive of type 










where 1 ≤ b1, b2 ≤ B.  
(ii) the Blue targetted by Red may or may not retaliate. We now have δb for the 
probability of retaliation to a single shot for live Blues of type b. Dead Blues do 
not fire back.  
Inter alia, (ii) enables us to consider the deployment of decoys by Blue.  
Red now gathers information about the Blues he is facing in a much more 
complicated way than previously. Index policies are still optimal, but the index structure 
is more complex and simple closed forms as in (8) above must not be expected. Consider 
a Blue target with assigned prior Π. Sufficient statistics gleaned from the history of Reds 
past engagements with this Blue, which will determine Reds posterior distribution for 
this target, are:  
(a) the number of Red shots faced by this target (n);  
(b) the outcome of the subsequent inspections (b = {b1, b2, , bn});  
(c) the number of retaliations by Blue (m);  
(d) the shot by Red to which Blue last retaliated (k).  
Note that m ≤ k ≤ n. The posterior probability that, given n, b, m, k, Blue is of type b and 
is still alive is proportional to  
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−∏a f a f a f a f a fφ θ δ δ , , ,  (14) 
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where H is used as a shorthand for the history (n, b, m, k). The posterior probability that, 
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as before. Hence, given history H, the posterior probabilities are given by  
 
p b P H P H P H
p b P H P H P H
b b b b bb
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Blue alive of type H







a f a f a fm r
a f a f a fm r.
  
The corresponding one-step index for a Blue with prior Π and history H is given by  
 
α
α δ θ α
Π
Π
b b b bb
b b b b b b bb
P H V r
P H r r P H
a f
a f a fa fm r a fa fo t
∑
∑ − + − − + −1 1 1 1
,  
and will frequently yield good shooting policies.  
In order to develop the index G(Π, H) for a Blue with prior Π and history H that can 
be used to determine optimal policies for Red, we require an iterative procedure due to 
Glazebrook and Greatrix (1995). Denote by Ω(H) the set of histories reachable (in the 
obvious sense) from history H and B{Ω(H)} the set of bounded functions on Ω(H).  
If H = (n, b, m, k) there are two distinct ways in which the history can evolve 
immediately from H, depending upon whether Blue retaliates or not during the next 
engagement with Red. If Blue does retaliate we have an evolution of the form  
 H H b ret n b b m n→ = + + +, , , , ,a f a fl q1 1 1  (16) 
on the assumption that neither party to the engagement is destroyed. To achieve the 
transition in (16), Blue needs to be judged by the sensor to be of type b and also to 
retaliate. If Blue does not retaliate, we have an evolution of the form  
 H H b nonret n b b m k→ = +, , , , ,a f a fl q1 . (17) 
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Let u ∈ B{Ω(H)} and H′∈ Ω(H). From Glazebrook and Greatrix (1995) we need to 
consider the transform TH: B{Ω(H)} → B{Ω(H)} defined by:  
T u H




r u H d nonret
r u H d nonret
r u H d ret
P H
D H
u H d nonret
P H V r
H
b b b bb b bb
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a fl qa f a fa f
a f
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a f
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a f














In (18) we use the notations established in (16) and (17), together with  
 D H P H P Hb b bba f a f a fm r= +∑ Π   




nT u H G H
→∞
=a fm ra f a fΠ  (19) 
for any u ∈ B{Ω(H)}. Observe that in (17), THn  denotes an n-fold application of TH i.e., 




Some Other Extensions  
The main report mentions some developments of the simple scenario of Section 1. In 
(i)  (iii) below, we identify some further elaborations for which index policies remain 
optimal. In (iv) we identify other possible extensions for which index policies will 
perform well, while not always being strictly optimal.  
(i) Each Blue type has a finite number of bullets (known to Red). This requires a 
modest elaboration to the index structure and index policies remain optimal.  
(ii) Red has a finite number of bullets. Here we have a finite horizon version of the 
(potentially infinite) battle depicted in Section 1. The index policy based on 
H(Π, n) remains optimal for the case that these are all decreasing in n.  
(iii) Here we elaborate the simple scenario in Section 1 by allowing all Blues that are 
still alive to take a shot at Red (after each of Reds shots), and not simply that 
Blue which was targetted. Suppose that Blue number j has a probability ηj of 
killing Red (irrespective of which Blue type he is) when he is not the Blue 
targetted. Typically the ηs will be much smaller than the θs. Under certain 
plausible additional conditions, the index in (8) will be replaced by the following 
for Blue number j:  
G n























, maxa f a f a f a f a f{ }a f a f b g b gm r=
− − − −















1 1 1 1




(iv) Other versions of the finite horizon problem in (ii) for which the indices are 
not all decreasing are not strictly indexable, but index policies will usually 
continue to do well. The same holds for a suggested development in which each 
Blue would remain in the targetting zone for Red for just a finite amount of time 
before leaving (having, for example, run out of fuel).  
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Appendix D 
Simulation Study  
This appendix reports on results from a simulation model implemented by  
P.A. Jacobs. The scenario is as in Section 1 of the main report with Blue targets being of 
two types. There are b1 type 1 Blue targets and b2 type 2 Blue targets. Red uses a sensor 
to initially estimate the type of each Blue target. The probability that Red classifies a type 
i target as type i is φii; otherwise it is classified as the other type. Natural priors for Red to 
use in this context are (see Appendix A):  
(a) for those Blues judged to be of type 1:  
  Π Π11 11 11 12 211= + = −φ φ φa f ;  
(b) for those Blues judged to be of type 2:  
  Π Π12 21 21 22 221= + = −φ φ φa f .  
The simulation model implements two shooting policies for Red:  (i) an index policy 
(as in Section 3 of the main report) with assigned values of V1 = V2 = 1, α = 1; and  
(ii) random shooting in which, at each decision epoch, Red chooses to engage one of the 
remaining Blues chosen at random (with equal probabilities). Some results are presented 
in Tables 1 and 2. In each cell of both tables we report the estimated mean number of 
Blues killed prior to Reds destruction, with the corresponding standard error in brackets. 
The upper figures in each cell correspond to the index policy and the lower to the random 
shooting policy. In all runs we take φ11 = φ22 = φ. All entries are based on  
100 replications.  
  
TABLE 1 
(Blue types very different:  r1 = 0.9,  θ1 = 0.1;  r2 = 0.1,  θ2 = 0.9)  

















































































The mean number of Blues killed by Red prior to Reds own destruction 
under (i) an index policy and (ii) a random shooting policy. 
TABLE 2 
(Blue types more alike:  r1 = 0.7,  θ1 = 0.3;  r2 = 0.3,  θ2 = 0.7)  

















































































The mean number of Blues killed by Red prior to Reds own destruction 
under (i) an index policy and (ii) a random shooting policy. 
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Although plainly a more extensive simulation study (with more replication) is 
desirable, certain major features are already transparent from Tables 1 and 2. As we 
might expect, the index policy outperforms the random shooting policy other than at 
φ = 0.5, where the sensor does no better than the flip of a fair coin and the two policies 
are virtually identical. The level of excess number of Blues killed achieved by the index 
policy is remarkably high when Red receives high quality information from the sensor 
assets (i.e., φ is high). However, even rather mediocre information (φ = 0.6, say) can be 
put to very good use by Red. The value of the information to Red is unsurprisingly 
greater when the Blue types are more distinct.  
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